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This article explores the attitudes of trade union organizations to restructuring and 
privatization of their enterprises to strategic foreign investors in Central and Eastern 
Europe’s biggest steel producers: Poland, Czech Republic, Romania, and Slovakia.  
Contra advocates of insulating technocratic decision-makers from social partners, this 
article argues that higher quality of democracy and concomitant social dialogue carried 
out at the level of the sector with union organizations that are autonomous of the 
government in power (as was the case in the Czech Republic and Poland), are associated 
with greater restructuring and with support for privatization to strategic foreign investors.  
In these circumstances, the unions actually pressure reluctant governments to accelerate 
the privatization process.   
By contrast, politically-motivated capture of individual enterprise-level unions 
and splitting them from sectoral-level organizations, as occurred in countries with lower 
quality of democracy (Romania and Slovakia), weakens the autonomous sectoral-level 
organizations, which are generally supportive of restructuring.  Conversely, captured 
unions remain far more resistant to reform than their counterparts belonging to 
autonomous sectoral organizations.  Thus, higher quality of democracy and concomitant 
vibrant social dialogue safeguard industrial restructuring.  
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The role of vested interests, including organized labor, in economic transition of 
postcommunist states has been the subject of heated debate. On the one hand, the 
neoliberal reformers advocated insulation of technocratic policy makers from the vested 
interests, seen to be driven by short-term financial gain and lacking long time horizons 
(Sachs 1993; Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994).  Critics of this approach recommended 
the opposite: the best way to ensure continued reform was to make the decision-making 
process inclusive by giving organized labor a stake in the process.  This would extend 
labor’s time horizons while making decision-makers more accountable to the public 
(Stark and Bruszt 1998). 
Despite completely different approaches to the means through which economic 
reform was to be achieved, both viewpoints essentially treat governments in power as 
reform-oriented.  While the neoliberals see reform as a uniform institutional blueprint to 
be imposed upon society, their critics treat it as a dynamic, context-specific compromise, 
reconciling the preferences of government and state actors with the interests of different 
stakeholders and societal actors.  The key challenge both approaches address is how to 
either block or engage potential anti-reform opposition in devising a reform program.   
The choice of blocking or engaging potential labor opposition raises two 
questions at a more basic level, which have important implications for the broader issue 
of reconciling democracy with economic reform.  First, under what conditions does 
organized labor become part of the opposition that can threaten the reform process?  
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Second, and more fundamentally, how does organized labor act when the government in 
power stalls the reform process?   
These questions are of substantive importance in light of both scholarship on 
labor and empirical observation of developments in the region.  After all, the relative 
quiescence of labor was a surprising development in the former workers’ states (Ekiert 
and Kubik 1998; Greskovits 1998; Crowley and Ost 2001).  This might lead skeptics to 
question whether labor has at all been a factor in the political economy of reform. 
Unions are indeed either paltry or lacking altogether in the service sector, and 
they have severely weakened in many industrial sectors (Gardawski 1999; 2001).  Yet, in 
the former flagship industries, whose employees were privileged under the former 
regime, unions have remained relatively powerful.  In fact, these sectors witnessed 
several significant strikes and the politicians often used the rhetoric of fostering “social 
peace” to postpone far-reaching reform in these sectors.   
The political consequences of delayed reform were profound.  Insufficient reform 
and concomitant charge of illegal state aid to the steel sector became a roadblock to the 
closure of European Union (EU) membership negotiations for “transition leaders” like 
Poland and the Czech Republic.  The allegation of union opposition to reform in the steel 
sector therefore vindicates the importance and relevance of the attitudes of organized 
labor to economic reform.  
This article explicitly investigates the conditions under which organized labor 
enlists itself as part of the anti-reform opposition.  It examines the relationship between 
the quality of democracy, structure of organized labor, and economic reform preferences 
of both labor and government in the critical steel sector in four transition economies: 
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Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, and Romania.  The analysis considers political 
embeddedness of organized labor, including the incentives and signals it receives from 
governments whose reformist credentials are questionable.   
The central argument is that higher quality of democracy and autonomous unions 
organized at the sectoral level are associated with greater restructuring and with support 
for privatization to strategic foreign investors.  Quality of democracy indicates the extent 
to which the regime in question fulfils the criteria of a liberal democracy and displays 
vertical and horizontal accountability, as well as civic pluralism.i  Union autonomy refers 
to union organizations not captured by the party (or coalition) in power and able to make 
decisions independently thereof.  Labor can be organized at two levels: enterprise and 
sectoral.  At the enterprise level, one or several unions represent worker interests in 
negotiations with enterprise managers.  At the sectoral-level, umbrella union 
organizations delegate individuals who represent the interests of labor in the tripartite 
negotiations with business and state representatives.ii   
The article empirically demonstrates that the politically-motivated capturing of 
individual enterprise-level unions and splitting them from the sectoral-level organizations 
by the governments in power occurred in countries with lower quality of democracy 
(Romania and Slovakia).  This, in turn, weakened the autonomous sectoral labor 
organizations, which were generally supportive of the restructuring process.  
Simultaneously, these captured enterprise-level union organizations remained far more 
resistant to change than their counterparts from autonomous sectoral organizations.  By 
contrast, in countries where the quality of democracy was higher (the Czech Republic and 
Poland), sectoral organizations remained cohesive and autonomous and the enterprise-
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level unions belonging to these sectoral organizations supported restructuring and 
privatization to strategic foreign investors.iii  Moreover, in what should come as a surprise 
for the advocates of insulating technocratic decision-makers from societal actors, they 
pressured reluctant governments to speed up the privatization process. 
Finally, moving beyond the debate concerning the virtues of isolating or engaging 
the societal actors, the article shows that in the post-privatization period, labor unions 
step in and support fragile state institutions.  They do so by playing a watchdog function 
to ensure that the new investors fulfill their contractual obligations.  In short, this article’s 
central contribution is the finding that not only do the autonomous, sectorally-organized 
social partners not endanger the industrial restructuring process, but they also serve as 




One of the most important goals of Soviet communism was rapid modernization, 
to be achieved through swift, heavy industry-based industrialization that would support 
the military-industrial complex of the Soviet Union and its satellite countries.  Workers 
employed in the heavy industry sectors, especially coal and steel, were particularly 
privileged in their remuneration and social prestige.  Consequently, industrial workers 
were considered to be the potential losers of transition and, ergo, the greatest opposition 
to radical change of the status quo.  They were expected to spearhead the popular 
backlash against reform after the initial “time of extraordinary politics” was over 
(Balcerowicz 1995).   
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For this reason, the neoliberal reformers advised isolating the prospective “losers” 
of the transition process from the technocrats in charge of making the painful, but 
necessary, decisions (Williamson 1990).  After all, according to the neoliberals, in 
enterprises experiencing financial problems “workers are interested in grabbing whatever 
income they can before they are forced to find alternative employment…In general, the 
best bet of the current insiders is to maximize their own current income, come what may” 
(Sachs 1993: 81).   
As a corollary to income maximization, the insiders were also perceived to want 
to defend their privileged position inside the enterprise.  Hence, the unions were not 
expected to want to give up control over their enterprises to outsiders, including foreign 
investors.  Needless to say, the neoliberals also treated the idea of insider control via 
ownership as anathema, and they argued against management and employee buyouts 
(Frydman and Rapaczynski 1994: 143).   
The critics of neoliberalism perceived the “unconstrained executive model” as 
fundamentally flawed on several counts.  First, it failed to incorporate societal interests, 
which could have key insights into maintaining the viability of reform.  Second, it did not 
ensure mutual oversight and institutional constraint among state bodies, leading to a weak 
or nonexistent horizontal accountability (Stark and Bruszt 1998: 168).  Third, its 
skepticism of the basic tenet of democracy: vertical accountability, or accountability via 
elections, proved erroneous.   
Regarding vertical accountability, empirical evidence has shown that robust 
political competition, far from resulting in an anti-reform backlash, or even 
circumscribing reform, has actually improved the quality of resulting economic and state 
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reform outcomes.  In an important blow to the advocates of insulating the executives, 
Hellman reveals a positive association between the frequency of elections, concomitant 
executive turnover, and the extent of economic reform. Robust political competition, 
Hellman argues, prevents policy capture by special interests and the emergence of 
“partial reform equilibrium” (Hellman 1998).  Orenstein focuses on the microprocesses 
underpinning these outcomes, as he shows that government turnover permits to correct 
the mistakes made by the predecessors (Orenstein 2001).  Grzymała-Busse, on the other 
hand, demonstrates that robust political competition leads to higher quality of state 
institutions and prevents their capture by specific interests (Grzymała-Busse 2007).    
While recognizing the merit of criticisms of the “unconstrained executive model” 
pertaining to vertical and horizontal accountability, this article focuses on the relationship 
between the executive and social partners.  The critics of the executive insulation thesis 
argue that embedding the executive in a network of social institutions aimed at 
consultation leads to increased transparency as it makes the decision-makers more 
accountable to the public.  A stake in the decision-making process also extends the time 
horizons of the representatives of labor, of civil society more generally, as well as of the 
decision-makers themselves, with the emerging policies becoming more cohesive.  
Rather than undermining the reform process, this more participatory form of democracy 
makes it more resilient (Stark and Bruszt 1998: 190).iv 
Whereas the unconstrained executive approach assumes that the government is 
pro-reform and that the unions oppose reform initiatives, its critics do not take the 
reformist agenda for granted and argue for the need of government oversight; hence, their 
emphasis on horizontal accountability.  Nonetheless, their treatment of the relationship 
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between the state and the social partners implies a pro-reform government engaging 
potentially resistant unions in the reform process.  What the union preferences would be 
in the absence of pro-reform prodding from the government remains unclear.   
This article, on the other hand, examines union behavior in conjunction with that 
of the government in power.  First, it investigates the conditions under which organized 
labor indeed threatens the reform process.  Second, it explores a neglected question of 
fundamental importance for the discussion of the role of labor in economic reform, 
namely the attitude of labor when the government is not spearheading the reform effort. 
When examining the relationship of organized labor to the government, there are 
two dimensions to consider: the structure of social dialogue and union autonomy.  The 
structural dimension refers to whether organized social dialogue exists at the sectoral 
level. Thus, the question is whether the government is insulated from the unions or 
whether it engages the unions institutionally.  Social dialogue organized at the sectoral 
level generally takes the form of tripartite commissions, composed of the representatives 
of labor, government, and business/employer organizations.  In the absence of sectoral 
social dialogue, enterprise-level politics predominate.   
The second dimension considers whether the unions are autonomous vis-à-vis the 
government or whether they are captured by it.  Generally, individual, captured unions do 
not preclude the presence of a separate, autonomous sectoral organization, albeit the latter 
is weaker than it would have been otherwise. While one could entertain the theoretical 
possibility that the government would attempt to capture the unions in order to push the 
reform process forward, it is much more plausible that the reason for union capture would 
be to ensure their quiescence in the rent-seeking activities benefiting those in government 
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and the management.  Thus, the autonomy vs. capture dimension explicitly introduces the 
possibility of the government acting as a rent-seeker, in addition to the standard focus on 
the unions as an explicit or potential culprit.  
 Let us now elaborate upon the preferences of the unions and the government and 
place these in the context of sectoral reform.  Reform means restructuring of the 
enterprises with the aim of making them economically viable on the world markets in the 
medium to long run without receiving state aid.  The latter stipulation is crucial as in the 
run-up to EU accession, candidate countries needed to demonstrate these enterprises’ 
impending ability to function on the world markets without state aid, as a condition of 
closing the competition chapter negotiations with the EU.  Moreover, any state aid 
administered after 1996 required retroactive EU Commission approval, tied to capacity-
cuts, with subsequent aid banned.  These demands placed severe limitations on potential 
state intervention in the sector and on financial propping up of enterprises, whether 
related to legitimate restructuring or to rent-seeking.  While reform entails measures such 
as employment, financial, technological, and organizational restructuring, given the 
amount of investment necessary to complete the process and the constraints on state aid 
to the sector, privatization to strategic (foreign) investors became the optimal solution for 
the cash-strapped enterprises.  
The reality of EU accession thus precluded a solution whereby the state would 
prop up failing enterprises in an effort to maintain existing workplaces, instead of 
compensating workers for the loss of employment as part of comprehensive restructuring.  
However, one could still ask what the theoretical trade-offs are, from the viewpoint of 
public interest, of state support for failing enterprises in an effort to save workplaces or 
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state support for workers laid off as part of employment restructuring.  After all, both are 
costly for the state.  On the one hand, one could argue that maintaining subsidized 
employment also supports employment in other places along the supply chain.  On the 
other, however, state subsidies help maintain an obsolete, inefficient production structure 
and thus hinder economic development.  And while one could counter-argue that 
economic change should be carried out in a gradual manner and that rapid employment 
cuts are deleterious to the fabric of society, contributing to social problems such as 
poverty, compensation for employment cuts is supposed to alleviate these problems.   
A perhaps more compelling reason to argue that compensation for employment 
cuts is more advantageous from a public interest point of view is that when propping up 
failing enterprises in the region, avoiding of social unrest has served as a very convenient 
cover for the rent-seeking activities ongoing at the enterprise.  Thus, only in a setting 
where rent-seeking is minimized, could one entertain the argument that subsidizing 
workplaces is better than subsidizing lay-offs.  While to various degrees, the cases at 
hand do not belong to that category, the reality of EU accession has anyhow eliminated 
the option of ongoing state support.        
Faced with the reform challenge, the task of the unions is to preserve employment 
and wages, in that order. Thus, unions oppose radical measures that would deprive their 
members of livelihood.  At the same time, they are likely to support measures that ensure 
the future of the enterprise and its workers, on the condition that the workers would be 
compensated for any job losses and that future developments would be relatively 
predictable.   
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The organization of social dialogue at the sectoral level has several advantages.  
While elongating the time horizons of the main actors involved, it also provides a 
sectoral, rather than enterprise-specific, perspective on the restructuring challenge.  This 
has two positive effects.   
First, following the logic used by Mancur Olson when discussing the salutary 
effects of encompassing organizations, it enables the participants to recognize their 
proposals’ effects on the rest of society, and, perhaps more importantly for the case at 
hand, on other enterprises in the sector.  This, in turn, tempers the rent-seeking 
temptations.  According to Olson, encompassing organizations, unlike very narrow 
“distributional coalitions,” “encompass a substantial portion of the societies of which 
they are a part” (Olson 1982: 47).   In contrast to distributional coalitions, they “care 
about the excess burden [to the rest of society] arising from distributional policies 
favorable to its members and…strive to make the excess burden as small as possible” 
(Olson 1982: 48).v   
However, Olson’s discussion of what constitutes an encompassing organization 
makes it difficult to operationalize the concept, as it is highly context-specific.  At times, 
Olson considers a single enterprise-level union to qualify as encompassing, at others, he 
claims that only peak associations that cover several industries can credibly result in 
increased efficiency gains for society.  As Olson admits, it is the incentives facing 
encompassing organizations, rather than their choices in particular circumstances, which 
matter the most for his discussion (52-53).  It is precisely these incentives, which the 
present discussion borrows.    
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In addition to providing incentives to take sectoral interests into account, social 
dialogue at the sectoral level also provides crucial information, without which the unions 
could miscalculate the feasibility of maximizing both workplaces and wages.  Without 
the sectoral perspective, union attitudes to reform are determined by the local context and 
unions’ calculations as to what course of action is feasible for maximizing their goals.  
Factors that influence calculation in this respect are enterprise size and importance for the 
local economy, as well as the perception of a hard budget constraint. 
 So far, the argument supports the logic employed by the critics of the executive 
insulation thesis in that sectoral-level social dialogue increases the amount of information 
available and elongates both the government’s and the unions’ time horizons.  However, 
let us now examine the preferences of the governments in power. While governments 
strive for reelection, they are also keenly aware of numerous patronage and rent-seeking 
opportunities that they have access to while in office and that persist as long as the largest 
enterprises remain under state control, directly or indirectly.   
These opportunities include giving lucrative positions on the enterprises’ 
supervisory boards to political supporters; directly engaging in business activities with 
the enterprises by setting up intermediaries selling overpriced inputs and buying 
underpriced products; or being involved in barter-based trading in inter-enterprise debt.  
The government in power may also pay lip service to reform while selling the enterprise 
to political supporters and sponsors, or even to government members.  In this context, 
procrastinating with reforms that result in viability on world markets without state aid 
may well be in the interest of the decision-makers and the “desire to avoid social unrest” 
could serve as a convenient cover for maintaining beneficial status quo.    
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The extent of the government’s access to these patronage and rent-seeking 
opportunities to a large degree depends on the quality of democracy: the higher the 
quality of liberal democracy in a given state, the smaller these opportunities.  Let us 
revisit the types of accountability characteristic of a liberal democracy: vertical, 
horizontal, and accountability to societal actors, all operationalized by the Freedom 
House indicators.  Prior to 2004, Freedom House’s Nations in Transit produced the 
democracy score index by assessing the following components: political/electoral 
process, civil society, independent media, governance, and rule of law.   
The electoral process indicator operationalizes the concept of vertical 
accountability.  As discussed, vibrant, competitive elections increase electorate’s 
oversight and the potential for “throwing the bums out,” in part for transgressions such as 
corruption.  Horizontal accountability serves to limit the potential for rent-seeking and is 
measured by the governance and rule of law indicators. By publicizing cases of abuse of 
power and exposing corruption, as well as simply keeping the citizens informed about the 
operation of government, independent media facilitate both vertical and horizontal 
accountability.  They also foster societal oversight of the government and the state.  This 
is measured indirectly by the civil society indicator. 
Therefore, vertical and horizontal accountability as well as societal oversight, 
found in countries with higher quality of democracy, limit the government’s patronage 
opportunities.  This, in turn, translates into limited opportunities to capture selected 
unions.  After all, ceteris paribus, if the unions want to ensure the workers’ future, they 
are reluctant to engage in activities that could endanger the enterprise’s welfare.  
However, going beyond Olsonian distributional coalitions, in the presence of 
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inducements from the government, generally found in countries with lower quality of 
democracy and thus smaller accountability, individual unions may be inclined to enter 
into clientelistic relations with it.  Thus, while harmful to the economy, the sector, and 
the enterprise in the long term, the short (or even medium)-term benefits for the union 
might be significant, in terms of preserving both jobs and wages.  The government, in 
exchange, would gain individual union’s support and free hand when engaging in rent-
seeking activities within the enterprise.  
By contrast, where democratic governance is of higher quality, one would expect 
to find greater government accountability, more limited incentives to collude with and 
capture unions, and hence, greater union autonomy.vi  Whereas the lack of captured 
unions could be seen as one manifestation of high quality of democracy in a given 
country (vibrant civil society), this outcome results from a specific incentive structure, 
which discourages union capture.   
Table 1 illustrates the discussed autonomy vs. capture and presence vs. absence of 
sectoral level dialogue dimensions, along with predictions concerning union behavior.  
Specifically, it distinguishes between the predictions of the critics of the executive 
insulation thesis (italicized) and union behavior hypothesized in this article (in bold).  
The expectation of proponents of the executive insulation model (omitted from the table) 
is uniform: unions block reform under all circumstances.   
 





 The preceding discussion and table 1 lend themselves to the formulation of the 
following hypotheses: 
 
H1:  [Inspired by the executive insulation thesis] Regardless of whether or not social 
dialogue is organized at the sectoral level, labor unions oppose reform.  If 
anything, organized social dialogue enables unions to overcome collective action 
problem and become more vociferous in opposing the reform process.  
 
H2: [Inspired by the critics of the executive insulation approach] Autonomous unions 
(assumed) are partners in supporting reform when organized social dialogue exists 
at the sectoral level.   
 
Note that according to the critics of the executive insulation approach, union behavior is 
unspecified when no structured social dialogue exists at the sectoral level and when the 
unions are captured.  This article hypothesizes the following to be the case:  
 
H2a:  Autonomous unions support reform when organized social dialogue exists at the 
sectoral level, even when the government is not spearheading reform. 
 
H3:  Captured unions oppose reform regardless of whether or not social dialogue is 
 organized at the sectoral level.    
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 Summing up, along with the critics of the executive insulation approach, this 
article hypothesizes that autonomous union organizations support reform when organized 
social dialogue exists at the sectoral level. However, they continue to support reform 
even when the government falters in its reform trajectory (H2a) and also when some 
unions become captured by the government and leave the sectoral-level organization.  By 
contrast, these captured unions become the main obstacle to economic reform (H3).  
Again, along the lines of the critics of the insulated executive thesis, when the union 
organizations are autonomous, yet organized social dialogue is lacking at the sectoral 
level, the behavior of the enterprise-level unions is more difficult to predict as it is 
grounded in the particularities of enterprise-level politics.  This includes the perception of 
the relative hardness of the budget constraint.   
 
Case Selection  
 
The steel sector represents a critical case in the examination of the relationship 
between organized labor and economic reform and, more specifically, in evaluating the 
executive insulation thesis.  If the thesis were to hold anywhere, it should hold in this 
sector.  Given their privileged position under the former regime, the workers in this 
flagship communist-era industry fit the archetype of the nefarious insiders perfectly.  
There is a methodological advantage to focusing on a single sector.  Since 
restructuring and privatization challenges vary by sector, concentrating on a single sector 
holds the sectoral-level variables constant and allows to focus on the variables of interest, 
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namely the organization of social dialogue and its relationship to the government in 
power.   
Finally, the steel sector remains very important in transition economies.  At the 
outset of transition, the share of total manufacturing industry (in current prices) held by 
the basic metals and fabricated metal products branch, of which the steel sector is the 
core, ranged from the 19.0% in Slovakia (largest industrial sector) to 14.7% in Romania 
(second largest).vii   
The branch was also an important employer.  In 1992, its share of employment 
ranged from 17.6% in the Czech Republic (biggest employer) to 9.9% in Slovakia (fourth 
biggest).viii  The sector’s fate thus had important implications for the economy and the 
labor force of the four countries.  Considered “sensitive” by the EU, the sector also 
mattered greatly in the EU accession process.     
 The selection of the four countries was driven by several considerations.  First, 
the sector is similarly important for their economies while the countries represent four 
most important steel producers in Central and Eastern Europe.ix  Second, the country 
cases varied significantly in terms of their political transition.  While Poland and the 
Czech Republic were on the forefront of political and economic reform, Slovakia and 
especially Romania, were once considered to be the “transition laggards.”x   
 Taking the mid-transition year 1997 as a reference point, table 2 illuminates the 
significant differences in the quality of democracy rankings of the country cases.  By 
1997, the Czech Republic and Poland have become consolidated democracies, with 
scores between one and two.  By contrast, Slovakia and Romania figure in the semi-
consolidated democracies category.  Several scores of four or greater, namely for 
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independent media, rule of law, and governance (in Romania), even place these countries 
close to the transitional government/hybrid regime.   
 





Consequently, we would expect the incidence of government cooptation of individual 
unions to be greater in Slovakia and Romania than in Poland and the Czech Republic, 
leading to captured union resistance to reform and to overall weaker autonomous sectoral 
organizations in the two prior cases. 
This paper uses qualitative methodology to test the presented hypotheses.  More 
specifically, it relies on process tracing to examine restructuring over time in the context 
of labor-business-state interaction.  Rather than providing a snapshot at a particular point 
in time, the examination of the entire process allows us to consider the effects of the 
development of social dialogue on attitudes of unions to economic reform in the sector, 
making causal inference possible.   
The evidence comes from a variety of primary sources, including author 
interviews with the main actors involved in the restructuring process: union leaders, 
employer organization representatives, enterprise managers, industry experts, former 
ministers, and civil servants responsible for social dialogue, restructuring, and 
privatization.  Newspaper accounts, union and government documents, and expert reports 







 There were several key developments characterizing social dialogue in the Czech 
steel sector.  First, the unions were autonomous and non-politicized, with no noted 
cooptation by the government.  Second, they were organized at the sectoral level and 
participated in social dialogue with the government.  Rather than blocking reform in the 
sector, the unions served as partners in the restructuring process, devising proactive 
measures to ease the social effects of restructuring.  However, the Czech unions went 
further and in advocating privatization to strategic foreign investors in the late 1990s, 
they seemed to be more reform-oriented than the reluctant government.   
 The national-level tripartite dialogue started as early as 1990 in Czechoslovakia 
and it helped to reduce tensions that transpired in the industry by assigning clear social 
partner roles to unions and managers.  This set the stage for sectoral-level dialogue 
between the employers’ association and the union organization Odborový Svaz KOVO 
(O.S. KOVO), which eventually began in 1995, when the first sectoral-level collective 
agreement was signed.  Moreover, the enterprise-level unions, supported by the sectoral 
and even national-level union organization, have played a watchdog role vis-à-vis the 
management and overwhelmingly defended the restructuring process.   
In voicing their dissent, the unions rarely resorted to direct strike action and 
tended to proclaim strike emergencies or engaged in short-duration (e.g., hour-long) work 
stoppages instead.  In general, interviewed trade union leaders, employer association 
representatives and Ministry of Industry officials involved in social dialogue at the 
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sectoral level confirmed that the relationship with the trade unions remained harmonious 
throughout the transition process (O.S. KOVO leader 2003; Steel Federation, Inc. 
representatives 2003; Civil servant at the Ministry of Industry and Trade 2003).   
In reflecting on the gradual changes in the sector, former government members 
pointed to union strength in the industrialized Northern Moravian region (Dlouhý 2004).  
Yet, while admirable in principle, social sensitivity masked the non-transparent buy-out 
deals with the management of the biggest enterprises in the sector, namely Nová Huť and 
Vítkovice.xi  Ultimately, these deals failed and left the enterprises in financial dire straits 
(Sznajder 2006).  As financial crisis hit the enterprises in the sector, the unions, under the 
umbrella of O.S. KOVO, became more involved in the restructuring process, as they 
pushed for the establishment of a sectoral-level tripartite commission, the so-called 
Consultative Team (Konzultativní Tým), to devise a constructive solution. This body 
brought together union leaders, employers, and the Ministry of Industry and Trade civil 
servants.   
 Organized in 1999, by 2000, the Team created the Associated Social Program 
(Doprovodný Sociální Program) intended to accompany the restructuring process until 
the end of 2003, then extended until the end of 2006, i.e., the end of the official 
restructuring period negotiated with the EU (O.S. KOVO leader 2003; Civil servant at the 
Ministry of Industry and Trade 2003).  The program provided support for laid-off 
workers meeting specific conditions, mostly pertaining to early retirement schemes not 
made explicit in the enterprise-level collective agreement.  From 2000 until 2003, the 
state paid over US$30 million to support 5,400 workers who used the program (Ministry 
of Industry and Trade 2003; Marek 2002).        
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 While the unions realized the critical circumstances of the sector, the successive 
Czech governments, both on the right and on the left, attempted to retain the Czech steel 
sector in the hands of domestic owners, rather than search for strategic (foreign) 
investors.  Nonetheless, the already mentioned management buy-out schemes ended in 
resounding failure.  In an effort to save the majority state-owned Vítkovice from 
bankruptcy in the aftermath of this failed initiative, the Czech government eventually 
brought in a crisis manager, Václav Novák, who subsequently faced much opposition 
from state quarters in his effort to restructure the enterprise.  
If the advocates of the insulated executive model were correct, one would have 
expected the unions to block reform.  However, in an interview with the author, Novák 
underscored that his greatest ally in restructuring was the company union, supported by 
the sectoral organization: “…the unions were fully behind me, which is surprising 
because I was so radical” (Novák 2008).  According to Novák, for the unionists, “the 
company was their life and they would do a lot for the company.”  “More than anyone 
else,” they realized the danger of bankruptcy.  Social dialogue became the cornerstone of 
the radical restructuring strategy: “I knew it that was going to be important and that’s 
why I tried to have them on my side. That’s why I went to their meeting every two 
weeks, explaining the progress.  I had a progress report which was much more detailed 
for them [sic] than for the supervisory board” (Novák 2008). 
 The situation was remarkably similar in Nová Huť, the biggest steel plant in the 
Czech Republic. With the plant facing liquidity problems, the Czech government put 
forth a series of controversial initiatives, attempting to consolidate the sector and to create 
one giant enterprise, to be restructured and presumably later sold to a strategic investor.  
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The initiative met with opposition from numerous quarters, including the EU, the 
International Finance Corporation, and other enterprises and unions.  In what may seem a 
surprising move, the Nová Huť union explicitly demanded the sale of the enterprise to a 
strategic foreign investor capable of ensuring the steelworks’ future.  Nová Huť 
steelworkers even protested in Prague and declared a strike emergency to support the 
entry of such an investor (Šmíd 2002; Adámková 2002).  Seeing opposition from 
numerous quarters, the government decided to scrap its consolidation program and 
quickly to negotiate a deal with LNM Holdings (currently Arcelor Mittal) before the 
upcoming 2002 elections.  This was not the first time the union raised such demands. In 
2000, the union organized a warning strike as it demanded that the management steps 
down, so as to open the way for privatization to a strategic investor (Právo 2000; Čápová 
2000).   
 Summing up, one can say that the Czech unions were a supportive force as far as 
enterprise reform was concerned.  As economic circumstances called for more radical 
restructuring, unions cooperated in a proactive way as they insisted on social support for 
laid-off workers.  They went even further, however, spurring on a reluctant government 
to privatize to strategic foreign investors, who would ensure the developmental prospect 
of their enterprises and hence, their workers.  
       
Poland 
 Compared to the Czech Republic, the political and economic situation in Poland 
was more volatile at the outset of transition.  In the paradox of Polish transformation, the 
Solidarity trade union, which led the struggle against communism, subsequently 
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supported neoliberal reforms.  Social dialogue at the national level was originally 
neglected under the assumption that Solidarity’s presence in government translated into a 
representation of worker interests.  This logic was proven wrong by social unrest in the 
summers of 1992 and 1993 and eventually led to the establishment of a tripartite 
commission at the national level.   
Initiated in 1994, the tripartite dialogue at the national level was marked by 
alliances of Solidarity and the OPZZ (Ogólnopolskie Porozumienie Związków 
Zawodowych or All-Poland Trade Union Alliance, the successor to the communist-era 
trade union organization) with the post-Solidarity or communist successor parties.  This 
was in contrast to the Czech case, where the unions eschewed politicization.  The union 
landscape was also marked by numerous unions being represented within a single 
enterprise.xii  Nonetheless, union politicization was far less pronounced at the sectoral and 
enterprise levels, where the interviewed union leaders highlighted their relatively smooth 
cooperation with the leaders of the other unions.xiii  Sectoral-level social dialogue, just 
like its national counterpart, evolved in response to wage-related labor unrest, marking 
the early years of transition.  According to questionnaires sent out to selected steel mills, 
during the course of the 1990s strikes occurred in 40% of the surveyed enterprises, with 
all strikes  occurring  prior to 1995 (Towalski 2003: 138).  These findings were seconded 
by an interviewed representative of the Association of Metallurgical Employers who 
claimed that the peak of wage-related social unrest in the sector took place in the early 
1990s (Association of Metallurgical Employers representative 2003; Towalski 2003: 139-
140; Gadomski 1997).   
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These wage pressures could be viewed as evidence of the nefarious influence of 
unions on the reform process, yielding support for the executive insulation model.  
However, in what flies in the face of the executive insulation thesis, but is in line with the 
critique of that model, the institutionalization of social dialogue at the sectoral level put 
an effective stop to wage strikes.    
 Social unrest at the enterprise level led to union pressures to organize social 
dialogue at the sectoral level (Civil servant at the Ministry of Economy, Labor and Social 
Policy (MELSP) 2003; Orenstein 2001).  In 1995, this resulted in the creation of the 
Tripartite Team for Social Conditions of Steel Industry Restructuring (Zespół Trójstronny 
ds. Społecznych Warunków Restrukturyzacji Hutnictwa), one of the very first tripartite 
commissions formed at the sectoral level. It involved civil servants from four ministries, 
five union organizations as well as the Association of Metallurgical Employers (AME) 
(Civil servant at the MELSP 2003; Towalski 2003).  The Tripartite Team then negotiated 
a sectoral-level agreement, establishing minimum wage in the sector and regulating 
overtime wages, supplemental awards, and other financial benefits (Towalski 2003: 135; 
AME representative 2003).  The signing of the Sectoral-level Collective Agreement in 
1996 resulted in much smoother relations at the enterprise level.  In the words of the 
AME representative, “since 1996 we had no wage-based strike in the Polish steel 
industry” (AME representative 2003).   
 At the same time, the managers were reluctant to lay off workers, as any such 
measures had remained contentious and no sectoral-level compensation packages have 
been devised.  The progressive decrease in the number of workers in the sector took place 
overwhelmingly via spin-offs and natural attrition. 
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 Nonetheless, as the EU pressures to comply with the EU acquis requirements in 
the steel domain increased, it became clear that more intensive restructuring steps were 
inevitable.  According to Europe Agreement signed with the EU in the early 1990s, the 
sector could not obtain state aid after December 1996.  However, it could get a 
retroactive one-time waiver, provided that the European Commission approved a 
restructuring program that would ensure the sector’s market viability by the end of 2006 
without further state aid.  Yet, government efforts, starting in mid-1990s, to bring in 
strategic investors to finish the restructuring process could at best be described as half-
hearted and lacking a comprehensive approach (Supreme Office of Control 2003).   
 According to Solidarity sectoral-level leader, unions realized that job losses 
would occur during the acceleration of the restructuring process.  Consequently, the 
unions wanted to make sure that “no one would be left on the street” and hence, similarly 
to their Czech counterparts, collectively pushed for a sectoral solution for workers to be 
laid-off (Solidarity Metalworkers’ Secretariat leader 2003).  These efforts resulted in the 
negotiation of the Social Package for Steel Industry (Hutniczy Pakiet Socjalny), signed in 
January 1999 by the Tripartite Team for Social Conditions of Steel Industry 
Restructuring.  The package provided for the establishment of additional severance 
payments for specific high-risk groups of laid-off workers.   
 The agreement paved the way for the departure of 57,000 workers during 1999-
2002, with 27,400 transferred to spun-off firms.  The total cost of employment 
restructuring amounted to about US$120 million, out of which the government covered 
directly about US$28 million (AME 2003).  This package was followed by another one, 
which was to accompany the final restructuring process geared at meeting the EU 
 27 
viability criteria, the Activation Package for Steel Industry, signed in 2003 (Hutniczy 
Pakiet Aktywizujący 2003).   
 In short, unions accepted the necessity of restructuring in the sector and aimed at 
minimizing its destructive social effects.  They did not just react to government 
initiatives, but proposed policies of their own.  Importantly, they were not the reason for 
the incoherent policy towards the sector, displayed by the Polish government.  As 
government insiders attested, full privatization to strategic foreign investors would have 
led to the loss of numerous patronage opportunities, not just by the managers but also by 
some state officials (Nowak 2003).  Hence, neither group was committed to the process.  
This became particularly clear in the late 1990s.   
By 2003, the situation became critical.  In 2001, the Polish government vacillated 
between sectoral consolidation, coordinated privatization, or both.  In 2001, with the 
election looming, the parliament passed a law providing for partial consolidation of the 
sector, in case a parallel, coordinated privatization effort should fail.  The law introduced 
the possibility of establishing Polish Steelworks (Polskie Huty Stali - PHS), involving a 
merger between the two biggest enterprises, Katowice and Tadeusz Sendzimir 
Steelworks and therefore eliminating competing capital investments in these two biggest 
market players (Nowak 2003). 
   The promising 2001 privatization attempts foundered, however, as the new 
coalition dominated by the communist successor party, which won the fall 2001 
elections, scrapped privatization talks and instead engaged in a sectoral consolidation 
effort.  With PHS created in December of 2002, privatization talks resumed only in the 
spring of 2003.  At the time, PHS was on the brink of bankruptcy and at the mercy of its 
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creditors.  The deadline for finishing the privatization talks loomed large, given that 
according to the accession agreement with the EU, state aid necessary for privatization-
related debt write-offs, could only be granted until the end of 2003.  Privatization (also to 
LNM Holdings), finally took place only in October of 2003.  
 In the meantime, the unions grew restless, realizing that the time for concluding 
the privatization agreement and the accompanying social package was running short.  
They were dismayed by the government’s sloth regarding privatization and concerned by 
the resulting uncertainty of their enterprise’s future.  As the top managerial interests were 
not embracing privatization and the deputy minister responsible for the privatization 
process was involved in a privatization-related corruption scandal, the unions were 
critical.  
The Solidarity sectoral level union leader said at that point in time: “The feeling 
right now is that we just want to know who the investor will be,” as the unions could then 
proceed to negotiate the privatization-related social packet (Solidarity Metalworkers’ 
Secretariat leader 2003).  The PHS-level unions went even further, issuing a letter to the 
Minister of State Treasury, responsible for the privatization process, in which they 
expressed “great concern” about the tempo of the “decisions related to privatization, for 
which we have been waiting for a number of months.”  Bemoaning the “lack of clear 
decisions of the Polish government regarding the future of Polish Steelworks and the 
attempts carried out in the last weeks by certain circles aimed at stopping the decisions 
related to the future of the firm,” the unions called for the minister to “take constant and 
direct control over the privatization process of Polish Steelworks, giving the enterprise an 
opportunity at development, which would make it possible not only to retain existing 
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work places, but also create an opportunity for their increase” (Multi-union committee 
2003).  Thus, the unions clearly favored the acceleration of selection of strategic foreign 
investors. 
 Summing up, in the Polish case, autonomous union organizations favored the 
development of sectoral-level social dialogue, which supported and indeed took the 
initiative regarding restructuring.  In what reflected the unions’ commitment to the 
welfare of their enterprises and the preservation of workplaces, they demanded clear pro-




Similarly to the Czech Republic, tripartite social dialogue at the national level had 
accompanied Slovak industrial relations from the beginning of the transition process and 
the centralized union structure adopted an ostensibly apolitical stance.  Despite its formal 
corporatist structure, however, the union movement had proven weak and unable to 
withstand government efforts to break it from within.  Slovakia’s near-monopolist steel 
producer, East Slovak Steelworks, Východoslovenské Železiarne (VSŽ), turned out to be 
the weak link as it broke labor unity and established patrimonial relations with the 
illiberal regime of Vladimír Mečiar and his Movement for a Democratic Slovakia 
(HZDS) party.xiv   
VSŽ was the dominant member of the Slovak sectoral union organization, O.Z. 
KOVO, Czech O.S. KOVO’s sister organization, and the strongest sectoral organization 
within the Slovak Confederation of Trade Unions (Konfederácia Odborových Zväzov – 
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KOZ).  In addition to metallurgy, O.Z. KOVO also represented workers in the 
engineering and electrical engineering sectors.  
VSŽ, a relatively modern enterprise, quickly became the site of extensive rent-
seeking.  Early in the transition process, its ownership structure became fragmented, as 
65% of its shares were sold during the first wave of voucher privatization in 1993, with 
the government retaining the largest share.  In March 1994 (three days after a 
parliamentary no-confidence vote in the Mečiar government), a company hastily created 
by members of the management closely tied to Mečiar, bought nearly 10% of VSŽ shares 
from the National Property Fund (FNM) at 20% of the book value, via a leveraged buy-
out.  Alexander Rezeš, one of the mangers, became the Minister of Transportation in the 
new Mečiar government, formed after the victorious 1994 elections.  In the same fashion, 
Mečiar-controlled FNM subsequently sold another 15% of shares to a Rezeš-allied firm.   
In 1994, the FNM sold the remaining 10% of VSŽ shares, at the same fraction of 
the book value, to Hutník, a firm set up by the enterprise-level union organization 
affiliated with O.Z. KOVO.  Hutník was closely allied with the Rezeš management and, 
by extension, with the Mečiar regime.  In essence, the enterprise-level trade union 
became a co-owner and co-manager of the enterprise, given the relatively large portion of 
shares at its disposal.  The business activities of the VSŽ union did not meet with the 
support of other enterprise-level unions within O.Z. KOVO or with the approval of the 
O.Z. KOVO leadership, which perceived this as blatant cooptation by the Mečiar regime 
(Trend November 27, 1996). 
Cooptation was complete when the leader of the O.Z. KOVO-affiliated union set 
up a rival organization, Metalurg, in November 1996, and convinced the overwhelming 
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majority of workers to leave the O.Z. KOVO affiliate and join Metalurg.  The unions 
within KOZ perceived the move as an effort by the Mečiar government to weaken the 
union movement at a time when it was becoming more critical of Mečiar’s politics and 
policies and assertive in its demands for partnership (Priority December 16, 1996; O.Z. 
KOVO leader 2004).  In the 1998 elections, while not explicitly endorsing a single 
political party, KOZ, including O.Z. KOVO, supported the anti-Mečiar opposition and 
the initial set of austerity measures it imposed.  These developments should come as a big 
surprise to the proponents of the executive insulation model.  They illustrate that the 
autonomous sectoral union organization opposed the rent-seeking government and rogue 
union practices and supported continued economic reform.  
By contrast, the captured Metalurg was clearly opposed to reform and implicated 
in the rent-seeking activities within VSŽ.  Given the enterprise’s relatively modern 
technology and production profile, VSŽ remained profitable following privatization to 
domestic “capitalists.”  Still, it was quickly falling prey to elaborate schemes of 
“tunneling” or asset-stripping.  According to an enterprise insider, Metalurg was “the 
gamekeeper-turned-poacher” (VSŽ insider 2004).  At the same time, the short-term 
interests of the workers were being protected, with no group lay-offs and with higher 
wages in comparison with the other enterprises in the sector (Trend November 27, 1996).  
The workers, however, were growing disillusioned with the management and with the 
rampant theft they were witnessing. 
The status quo benefited the government in power and the managers-cum-owners.  
One of the three top managers of one such asset-stripping intermediary, Barkos, which 
had exclusive rights to sell VSŽ products in North America, topped the HZDS electoral 
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list in the 1998 elections (Hospodarské noviny October 27, 1997; Hutňan 1999: 3; Trend 
2000).   
In the meantime, VSŽ took out syndicated loans from Merrill Lynch in 1995 ($35 
million) and ING Bank N.V. in 1996 ($125 million).  With VSŽ unable to repay the 
loans, in 1998, the lenders declared cross-default and the enterprise found itself on the 
brink of bankruptcy.  The new government, elected on a radical reform platform, was 
first of all financially unable and second, unwilling, to protect management having close 
ties to its political adversary.  At the same time, it was keen to avert the social, political 
and economic catastrophe, which would follow bankruptcy and possible liquidation of 
VSŽ (Eichler 2008). 
The new government became involved in resolving the crisis, as a foreign bank-
approved crisis manager was eventually elected by the shareholders to succeed the 
compromised management, which resigned.  The new CEO’s task was to convince the 
banks to wait for the results of immediate restructuring and reprivatization to strategic 
foreign investors, rather than pressing for bankruptcy.  He also started to prepare the 
enterprise for subsequent sale to a strategic investor who would ensure long-term 
development of the enterprise (Profit 2000).   
The behavior of Metalurg and its leader during the debt work-out and 
privatization process stood in stark contrast to that of the Polish and Czech union leaders, 
who demanded the entry of a strong foreign partner, capable of finishing the restructuring 
process.  Metalurg’s behavior could at best be termed as obstructionist (Eichler 2008).  
By August of 1999, its leader even initiated an unsuccessful motion to fire the new CEO 
(Hospodarské Noviny August 26, 1999).   
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 Despite numerous obstacles from sympathizers of the old management, including 
Metalurg’s leader, the new CEO, along with the Slovak government representatives, 
negotiated a mutually satisfactory arrangement with U.S. Steel (Reuters Company News 
2000).  Critically for the region, the new enterprise, U.S. Steel Košice, would retain full 
employment for the following ten years, with employee departures only via natural 
attrition, in exchange for generous tax holidays.   
Following the sale, Metalurg decided that Hutník’s mission was complete and that 
it should end its business activities.  After the union leader’s departure from Metalurg, the 
relationship between the union and the new management has been proceeding smoothly 
(Top management member, U.S. Steel Košice 2004; Metalurg union leader 2004; O.Z. 
KOVO union leader 2004).  One could also note rapprochement between O.Z. KOVO 
and Metalurg, with increasingly close cooperation between the two (O.Z. KOVO leader 
2004; Metalurg leader 2004). 
 Thus, in the Slovak case, unlike those of the Czech Republic and Poland, we saw 
an illiberal government successfully coopt a union.  In what should come as a big surprise 
to the proponents of the executive insulation model, the autonomous sectoral union 
organization, unlike the captured union, supported continued economic reform. 
 
Romania 
 The Romanian case, similarly to the Slovak one, is distinctive for the initial 
government cooptation of the union in the biggest enterprise in the steel sector.  It is also 
remarkable for weak state capacity and for parchment institution-like social dialogue at 
the sectoral level.   
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 The autonomous National Union Federation Metarom represents metal and heavy 
industry workers, as well as miners, and is part of the Cartel Alfa Confederation.  Unlike 
some other confederations, such as CNSLR-FraŃia, which is closely associated with the 
communist-successor Social Democratic Party (PSD), Cartel Alfa has remained 
avowedly apolitical (Metarom leader 2004; Dandea 2004; Kideckel 2001: 105).     
 Early in the transition process, the illiberal Romanian government aimed to 
weaken the nascent independent labor movement by forming alliances with powerful 
local unions and coaxing them to split from new, independent national and sectoral union 
structures.  Such was the case of the mine workers in the Jiu Valley, who were initially 
part of the Cartel Alfa Confederation, but subsequently formed their own organization 
(Metarom leader 2004).  In a situation analogous to that of Slovakia’s VSŽ, early in the 
transition process, the enterprise-level union organization at Sidex, the most significant 
steel producer in Romania, withdrew from the Metarom Federation.  It set up its own 
Unionist Federation of Iron and Steel Workers of GalaŃi (Sidex’s location).  According to 
the Vice-President of the Cartel Alfa Confederation, the leaders of the controversial post-
revolution National Salvation Front: 
 were unhappy to see these important structures of civil society grow up and they 
 were really unhappy that these structures would become very powerful and 
 immediately decided to weaken these structures and used some trade union 
 leaders in order to do that.  The miners and GalaŃi union are just two examples, 
 but in early 1990s, these two federation structures were the most important 
 federation structures in Romania (Dandea 2004).  
 
The GalaŃi union gained the status of a federation, even though it only had local 
representativeness (Metarom leader 2004; Civil servant at the Ministry of Work, Social 
Solidarity and Family 2004).  Throughout transition, Sidex workers were particularly 
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privileged compared to other workers in the sector, in terms of wages and job security 
(COST leader 2004; Dandea 2004, Metarom leader 2004).        
 With the Sidex union captured early on, the Metarom Federation clearly 
dominated in the remaining enterprises (Metarom leader 2004; Info Metal 1997-2004).  
While labor unity was undermined, Romanian social dialogue had officially been 
institutionalized not only at the national but also at the sectoral level early in the 
transition.  The negotiations of the first branch-level collective agreement began in 1992, 
earlier than in any of the other country cases.  They ended in 1994, leading to an increase 
in the minimum wage by 35%, giving the sector’s wages the third highest rank in 
Romanian industry (Metarom leader 2004).  Throughout the transition period, despite 
several short-duration general strikes and protests in the capital, the relationship with the 
federation was not seen as tense by state representatives (Civil servant at the Ministry of 
Work, Social Solidarity and Family 2004).   
 Regardless of the formal structure of sectoral-level social dialogue, the enterprise 
level had remained the core of union activity, with the sectoral-level organization playing 
a relatively peripheral role.  Quoting Cartel Alfa’s vice-president:    
the Romanian trade union structure is a very fragmented one...In many situations, 
the superior structures, branch or national ones, have nothing to do with the 
activity developed inside the plant by plant trade union [sic].  Usually, we are not 
interfering with the activity, we are just participating in some activity, but just in 
case[s] [where] we had an official request by the plant trade union (Dandea 2004). 
 
 Thus, given the relatively weak sectoral-level institutions, undermined by an 
illiberal government early in the transition process, social dialogue was unable to become 
an effective instrument for introducing greater certainty into the reform process and 
elongating the time horizons for all actors involved.  Unlike Poland, the enterprise wage 
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pressure persisted, despite agreements at the sectoral level.  This attitude, however, 
changed over time, as the market mechanism became more palpable.  According to an 
interview with a local union leader, the enterprise-level unions in Romania  
opposed large workforce reductions and policies, which prohibited wage increases 
when the company had very bad results.  Afterwards, they realized that an 
equilibrium needs to be established between what can be given and what the 
firm’s performance permits…  Otherwise, they don’t have a way of getting the 
salaries (Silcotub union leader 2004).    
 
 While the proponents of the executive insulation thesis might treat union wage 
pressure as evidence in favor of their argument, it is important to underscore that the 
wage push did not come from the sectoral-level organization, but rather, from the 
enterprises where the local management supported the wage requests, as it continued to 
engage in dubious business activities within the enterprise.  A broad range of 
interviewees from the sector cited widespread incidence of local, politically-connected 
“tick companies,” firme-cǎpuşǎ, which engaged in parasitic relationships with the state-
owned enterprises (SOEs) and usually took the form of transfer pricing using 
intermediaries.   
Shortly before the 2000 elections, the Romanian Prime Minister, Mugur Isǎrescu 
referred to “political forces blocking the privatization process,” and recognized that there 
are “heaps of tick-companies benefiting from rents which they obtained or continue to 
obtain presently, from state-owned enterprises” (Mediafax November 11, 2000).  In other 
words, while the enterprise-level unions from the autonomous Metarom federation were 
generally more taciturn regarding reform than their autonomous counterparts from the 
other country case studies, they also could not be said to be blocking reform efforts of the 
government.   
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 As in the other country cases, the sectoral-level organization Metarom realized 
that restructuring would involve job losses and therefore demanded compensation for 
workers leaving the sector.  However, Metarom was not content with mere severance 
packages but pushed for professional reconversion programs modeled after those in 
western Europe.  In June of 1996, Metarom signed the Social Assistance Agreement for 
the Iron and Steel Industry Restructuring (ConvenŃia de Acompaniament Social al 
Restructurǎrii Metalurgiei Româneşti), with the precursor of UniRomSider, the current 
employer organization in the sector.  Among others, this agreement provided for the 
creation of a “national solidarity fund for the iron and steel industry” to support the 
professional reconversion program, FONDMET (ConvenŃia de Acompaniament Social 
1996). 
 Whereas similar initiatives in the Czech Republic and Poland were implemented 
immediately upon adoption, in Romania, it took nearly five years from the time of the 
initial signing of the Convention by the social partners to the passage of the law 
implementing steel sector social assistance measures (Metarom leader 2004; Parlamentul 
României, Lege nr. 145 din 3 aprilie 2001).  By that time, privatization-related group lay-
offs became particularly salient.  Up to that point, these were not generally being 
negotiated with the unions.   
 While the Romanian sectoral-level organization, like its Czech and Polish 
counterparts, recognized the need for restructuring, it is notable that Metarom, along with 
its enterprise-level affiliates, took a more reserved approach to privatization.  While in 
principle, Metarom considered privatization to be “conducive to increased efficiency of 
the enterprises” (Info Metal International 2003: 11), the union opposed the International 
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Financial Institutions-inspired rapid privatization, carried out without a concomitant 
sectoral restructuring strategy demanded by the EU.  As Metarom president put it: “We 
are not against privatization, but we seek that it be done in a real way, with true investors, 
and that the employees be given guarantees concerning workplaces or compensation” 
(Mediafax October 23, 2000).   
 This reserved attitude can be attributed to the painful privatization experience of 
the Romanian steel sector in the late 1990s. There were two distinct privatization waves.  
The first phase, over the years 1998-2000, attested to the low capacity of the Romanian 
state and was symptomatic of the parchment institution-like nature of its social dialogue.  
Marred by underspecified buyer-seller obligations, it did not involve the unions in the 
privatization process, and remained conspicuously silent concerning post-privatization 
labor restructuring.   
The non-transparent privatization process and the resulting contracts created 
uncertainty among the workers.  Mounting suspicions were usually confirmed by non-
strategic foreign investors who trammeled worker rights, stripped the assets of the 
enterprise, or both.  The egregious cases of Tepro Iaşi, ReşiŃa, and Petrotub Roman 
vividly illustrated these problems.  Rightly fearful about the workers’ future but also 
instigated by local political figures, the enterprise-level unions in these three enterprises 
vehemently, and successfully, protested to cancel the privatization contract (Sznajder 
2006).   
Contradicting the proponents of executive insulation thesis, instances of 
privatization-related enterprise-level labor unrest overwhelmingly occurred after signs 
that a specific privatization was experiencing problems, rather than prior to it.  In the two 
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remaining first-wave privatizations (Artrom Slǎtina and Silcotub Zalǎu), which were 
relatively successful, the engagement of the enterprise-level unions by the new 
management at the time of privatization (Artrom) and soon thereafter (Silcotub) was 
much greater (Sznajder 2006).    
 The second wave of the privatization process, starting in 2001, in turn, was 
carried out under the auspices of the International Financial Institutions, which put 
tremendous pressure on the Romanian government.  The sectoral union was not 
enthusiastic about the process and bemoaned the lack of far-reaching pre-privatization 
restructuring, so as to sell the enterprises at a higher price.  However, it did not impede 
the process (Metarom leader 2004).  As for the enterprise-level unions, they were 
generally consulted, with post-privatization employment-related provisions specified in 
the privatization contract.  In two out of six of the privatization cases, Siderurgica 
Hunedoara and Petrotub Roman, the negotiations were accompanied by worker unrest 
over the size of layoffs (Dandea 2004). 
 In large part, worker resentment was fueled by comparison with the privatization 
deal obtained by Sidex from the same investor (LNM, now Arcelor Mittal), which 
entailed employment restructuring via natural attrition only, for the period of five years.  
Sidex’s 27,700-strong workforce, represented by the union captured by the government 
early in the transition process, was indeed a force to be reckoned with.  However, in the 
case of Sidex, any discussion of privatization was summarily delayed by the patently 
politically-connected managers who reaped rents from business exchanges with Sidex 
and were highly resistant to changing the status quo.xv  Whereas it is difficult to estimate 
the scope of this phenomenon, shortly before the privatization in 2001, the Romanian 
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Prime Minister estimated the number of firme-cǎpuşǎ at Sidex at around 1,400 
(Economist Intelligence Unit 2001).  Thus, the union opposition to privatization served as 
a fig leaf for the managerial interests.   
Nonetheless, with Sidex in dire financial straits, incurring losses of $1 million a 
day, and with the government facing heavy pressure from the World Bank to privatize the 
enterprise, both the managers and the union eventually relented.  Having argued for the 
delay of privatization, the Sidex union reconciled itself to the prospect and engaged in 
vigorous negotiations concerning post-privatization employment restructuring.  Indeed, 
on July 24, 2001, the government signed a privatization contract worth $500 million with 
LNM Holdings, the fourth-largest world steel producer at the time (Economist 
Intelligence Unit August 3, 2001).  In the post-privatization phase, similarly to the Slovak 
case, there occurred a rapprochement between the Sidex union and the Metarom 
federation (Sidex union leader interview 2004; Metarom leader 2004).   
Overall, the Romanian case is distinctive for the initial government cooptation of 
the union in the biggest enterprise in the sector.  Despite early de jure institutionalization 
of social dialogue in the sector, it remained largely a parchment institution, with the state 
lacking the capacity and the will to implement the negotiated sectoral restructuring 
agreements.  Weakness of state institutions also exacerbated union distrust of 
privatization at the enterprise level, as the unions doubted the quality of buyers.  
However, active union opposition to privatization transpired overwhelmingly after the 
new owners failed to deliver on their privatization obligations, rather than as a deterrent.  
Thus, in the absence of a state guarantee concerning investor quality, the unions stepped 
in to play a watchdog function over their enterprises.   
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Case Studies in Comparative Perspective 
 
Let us now explicitly connect the case studies to the presented theory and 
hypotheses, as well as to each other.  In the two cases where the quality of democracy 
was high in the mid-transition years, namely, the Czech Republic and Poland (see table 
2), the union movement had remained autonomous of the government.  Both cases 
provide evidence against the insights of the executive insulation model, subsumed under 
Hypothesis 1.  The lack of significant wage-related social unrest early in the transition 
period is associated with the development of tripartite social dialogue at the national level 
early in the transition period in Czechoslovakia.  The Polish case, however, goes beyond 
correlation, and clearly illustrates a causal relationship between the institutionalization of 
social dialogue and social peace.  Both union and employer association representatives in 
Poland attributed the absence of wage strikes to the sectoral-level agreements concerning 
wages.  Thus, the Czech and Polish cases strongly support Hypothesis 2 and the insights 
of the critics of the executive insulation model. 
However, the evidence in the Czech and Polish cases goes further than what is 
explicitly stated by the critics of the executive insulation model and indicates that the 
autonomous organizations were pro-reform even in the absence of a squarely pro-reform 
government.  In both countries, the sectoral labor organizations took the initiative to 
organize financial and job training support to alleviate the social effects of the anticipated 
employment restructuring/layoffs in the sector.  Second, in the key privatizations in both 
countries, the enterprise-level unions actually demanded that the government speed up 
the privatization process, so as to ensure the future of the workers of the enterprises in 
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question.  Thus, the Czech and Polish cases provide support for Hypothesis 2a, which 
does not predicate union attitudes on the pro-reform inclination of the government.    
The Slovak and Romanian cases provide a stark contrast to the Czech and Polish 
ones, although there are notable differences between them.  In Slovakia and Romania, 
lower quality of democracy placed these countries in the semi-consolidated democracies 
category in the mid-transition years, with the Romanian case bordering on the hybrid 
regime category.   
In Slovakia, the illiberal Mečiar regime managed to split the labor movement by 
capturing the union at the biggest steelworks in the country.  The captured union’s 
behavior supports Hypothesis 3.  In what provides evidence against Hypothesis 1 and in 
support of Hypothesis 2a, the severely weakened sectoral-level organization remained 
supportive of the economic reform process.  It saw it as the key to providing long-term 
developmental prospects for the economy, in part by lowering the level of political 
capitalism in the country.  Therefore, the sectoral organization not only supported the 
privatization of VSŽ to U.S. Steel, but it also endorsed the pro-reform forces in the 
crucial 1998 elections. 
The Romanian case is more nuanced.  As in Slovakia, only earlier, the illiberal 
government split the union movement to weaken the nascent civil society.  The captured 
union was certainly not supportive of reform, but the politically-connected Sidex 
managers preempted any radical moves on its part, effectively sabotaging any reform 
announcements.  Only after the anti-reform coalition within the enterprise saw opposition 
to privatization as a losing fight, did the union acquiesce to it.  Thus, the Romanian case 
clearly supports Hypothesis 3. 
 43 
The evidence against Hypothesis 1 is also strong.  As is obvious from the case 
study, the autonomous Metarom Federation for a long time in vain advocated 
employment restructuring support measures similar to those of its Czech and Polish 
counterparts.  Rather than blocking reform, the organization was trying to be a partner in 
the restructuring effort, even if its sway over the individual enterprise unions was 
relatively weak.  Moreover, the fact that the lack of privatization-related social dialogue 
at the enterprise level in the first privatization wave only created union uncertainty and 
fueled mostly justified suspicions clearly contradicts Hypothesis 1. By contrast, far wider 
consultation with social partners during the second wave of privatization created a much 
smoother and more transparent privatization process.   
The observed low state capacity also explains why the support for Hypothesis 2a 
in Romania may seem weaker than in the other cases.  While Metarom wanted the state 
to be a partner in restructuring, taught by painful experience, it did not see privatization 
to foreign investors as the best solution since it simply did not trust the state to select 




The role of labor unions in economic reform has been the subject of much heated 
debate.  For the proponents of the insulated executive thesis, the steel sector is a critical 
case. Given its privileged position under communism, far-reaching restructuring of the 
sector would have been expected to generate much opposition among the workers.  
Indeed, the slogans of “maintaining social peace,” given as a reason for the sluggish pace 
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of reform in the sector, might be seen as a vindication of the insulated executive model.  
A close inspection of the four biggest steel producers among the Central and Eastern 
European countries, however, has indicated that robust social dialogue with autonomous 
unions, organized at the sectoral level, was conducive to reform in the sector.   
Labor union vs. government relations should be considered through the prism of 
democratic governance.  For the proponents of democratic values, social dialogue is a 
good in itself, an exponent of a vibrant civil society.  The evidence in this paper shows 
that there is no trade-off between economic efficiency and democratic values as far as 
social dialogue is concerned.  Rather, democratic practice reinforces economic efficiency.  
This is because other aspects of governance encountered in countries displaying high 
quality of democracy, namely well-developed vertical and horizontal accountability, 
constrain the government, making it difficult to create patrimonial ties with individual 
unions.  Union autonomy, on the other hand, combined with functioning social dialogue 
at the sectoral level, creates encompassing organizations that enable the unions to look at 
the long-term interests of the sector’s workers as a whole.   
However, this emphasis on long-term strategy makes the autonomous unions 
behave in ways going beyond the expectations of the critics of the insulated executive 
approach.  Rather than simply being engaged by pro-reform governments as social 
partners in the restructuring process, the autonomous unions have indeed pushed stalling 
governments to implement long-term reform in the sector, one which would preserve jobs 
and wages in the future. 
Could it be that the autonomous unions have displayed false consciousness and 
espoused neoliberalism instead, as some scholars have suggested (Ost 2000)?  There is 
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not much evidence to support such a claim.  Rather, the autonomous unions have 
understood the necessity of the entry of a strategic investor to ensure their enterprises’ 
survival.  Given the restrictions imposed by the European Union on state aid, there was 
not much choice regarding the method of restructuring.  
One could point to the instances of privatization-related unrest by autonomous 
unions, as happened in Romania, to question this central finding.  However, such unrest 
overwhelmingly took place in the aftermath of a poorly prepared, unconsulted and 
untransparent privatization process, which by no means brought a strategic investor into 
the companies.  Thus, the autonomous unions played more of a watchdog function in the 
post-privatization period, ensuring that workers’ rights are respected but also that the 
investors are abiding by their commitment to the enterprise. 
Moreover, individual union capture by illiberal governments resulted in the 
weakening of the autonomous sectoral-level organizations and in vociferous opposition 
by captured unions to the mere suggestions of reform.  Thus, once again contradicting the 
proponents of the insulated executive thesis, the weakening of the labor movement was 
associated with more, rather than less, opposition to reform.   
In short, this article has shown that higher quality of democracy and concomitant 
vibrant social dialogue can actually safeguard industrial restructuring.  Not only should 
reformers not be afraid of engaging in social dialogue, but they should see autonomous 
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Table 1. Union structure and relationship to the government: predictions  
 






at sectoral level 
 
Unions partners in 
supporting reform 
 
Unions support reform 
 
 
Union behavior unspecified 
 
Captured unions block 
reform (while autonomous 









Union behavior unspecified 
 
 
Union support for reform 
depends on enterprise 
 
Union behavior unspecified 
 
Captured unions block 
reform (while autonomous 
union support for reform 
depends on enterprise) 
 
 
             Predictions of executive insulation critics are italicized. 
             Argument hypothesized in this article appears in bold.  
            Proponents of the executive insulation model posit that unions 



































Political Process 1.25 1.50 3.75 3.25 
Civil society 1.50 1.25 3.25 3.75 
Independent media 1.25 1.50 4.25 4.25 
Rule of law 1.50 1.50 4.00 4.25 
Governance 2.00 1.75 3.75 4.25 
 
Note: The ratings, according to Freedom House, are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the 
highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic progress. Source: Freedom House 2008. 
























                                                 
i
 When assessing quality of democracy, I use the criteria of a liberal democracy since the concept captures 
well the multifaceted nature of transition.  In addition to the minimalist electoral component (vertical 
accountability of rulers to the ruled), the absence of reserved domains of power for non-elected bodies 
(such as the military), and horizontal accountability of officeholders to one another, liberal democracy also 
reflects civic pluralism.  See: Diamond 2003: 34-35. 
ii
 Depending on country-specific organizational structure, these can be individuals representing a single 
umbrella organization for the sector as a whole, or individuals representing different umbrella 
organizations, which then coordinate their demands.  The umbrella organizations are held accountable by 
the enterprise-level organizations.   
iii
 The distinction between cohesiveness and autonomy highlights the consensus among the sectoral 
organizations as to their desired autonomy from the government (i.e., resistance to capture). 
iv
 Stark and Bruszt use concept of “extended accountability,” which combines horizontal accountability 
with accountability to organized societal actors (Stark and Bruszt: 188-191).  For greater analytical clarity, 
I distinguish between the two.     
v
 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this point.  
vi
 The present discussion raises the question of the determinants of quality of democracy in the region. For a 
discussion of the literature on this topic, see Cameron 2007. 
vii
 The data for the Czech Republic, Poland, and Romania are from 1990. For Slovakia, the reference year is 
1993, the earliest when data was available. See: Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies 2005.  
viii
 1992 was the first year when comparable data was available. Ibid. 
ix
 This article defines Central and Eastern Europe as those postcommunist countries which, Baltic states 
excepted, never belonged to the Soviet Union in the post-1945 period.  
x
 Romania’s problems were more deeply ingrained whereas Slovakia’s context dramatically improved 
following the ouster of Vladimír Mečiar’s regime in 1998. 
xi
 This was in addition to the corruption-tainted sale of Třinecké Železárny in 1996, which resulted in the 
Civic Democratic Party (ODS) scandal in 1997.   
xii
 The number would vary between two, as in the former Warsaw Steelworks and fourteen, as in Katowice 
Steelworks.   
xiii
 Based on nine interviews with current and past union leaders, a representative of employers’ association 
in the sector, and a civil servant at the Ministry of Work and Social Policy. See also Towalski 2003.  
xiv
 In the 1990s, VSŽ was responsible for 93% of Slovak steel production and for the generation of about 
10% of Slovak GDP.  Employing over 20,000 people, it was indirectly responsible for about 100,000 
workplaces in a country of 5.4 million people.   
See: (Hutňan 1999; Marcinčin 2000: 329). 
xv
 For example, from 1994 until 1999, Sidex’s management was contracted out to a private firm, Siderman 
S.A., owned in part by Ion Florentin Sandu, a communist successor party deputy from GalaŃi, elected in 
1996 and again in 2000  (Mediafax April 15, 1999). 
